



































Most people are very surprised by the 
claim that we live in the most peaceful 
period in history. Are we not flooded 
with media reports and images of con-
flicts around the world today, some of 
them very active and bloody, and oth-
ers seemingly waiting to happen? Have 
the United States and its allies not been 
involved in a series of messy wars over 
the past few decades? Scholars, for their 
part, ask themselves, if there has indeed 
been a decline in belligerency, when ex-
actly did it begin: with the end of the 
Cold War, in 1945, or perhaps earlier? 
And what exactly caused it?1
Again, most people are surprised to 
learn that the occurrence of war and 
overall mortality rate in war sharply de-
creased from as early as 1815 onward, 
especially in the developed world. The 
so-called Long Peace among the great 
powers after 1945 is more recognized, 
and is widely attributed to the nuclear 
factor, a decisive factor to be sure, which 
concentrated the minds of all the pro-
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tagonists wonderfully, as they say about 
the hanging rope. The (inter-)democrat-
ic peace has been equally recognized. 
However, the decrease in war had been 
very marked even before the nuclear era, 
and has encompassed nondemocracies 
as well as democracies. In the century 
after 1815, wars among industrializing 
countries declined in their frequency to 
about a third of what they had been in 
the previous centuries, an unprecedent-
ed change. Compared to their record 
during the eighteenth century, Aus-
tria and Prussia, for example – neither 
of them a democracy – fought about a 
third to a quarter as much during the 
century after 1815.
Indeed, the Long Peace after 1945, 
more than 70 years to date and count-
ing, was preceded by the second long-
est peace ever among the modern great 
powers, between 1871 and 1914, 43 years 
in all; and by the third longest peace, be-
tween 1815 and 1854, 39 years. Thus, the 
three longest periods of peace by far in 
the modern great powers system have 
all occurred after 1815, with the first two 
taking place before the nuclear age. This 
striking phenomenon cannot be acci-
dental. A decline in belligerency began 
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from 1815, not 1945 or 1989. Clearly, one 
needs to explain the entire period of re-
duced belligerency since 1815, while also 
accounting for the glaring divergence 
from the trend: the two world wars.
There is a tendency to assume that 
wars have declined in frequency during 
the past two centuries because they have 
become too lethal, destructive and ex-
pensive – fewer but more ruinous wars. 
This hypothesis barely holds, however, 
because relative to population and wealth 
wars have not become more lethal and 
costly than earlier in history. The wars 
of the nineteenth century, from 1815 
to 1914 – the most peaceful century in 
European history – were in fact particu-
larly light, in comparative terms. Prussia 
won the German Wars of Unification 
in short and decisive campaigns and at 
a remarkably low price, and yet Ger-
many did not fight again for 43 years. 
True, the world wars, especially World 
War II, were certainly on the upper scale 
of the range in terms of casualties. Yet, 
contrary to widespread assumptions, 
they were far from being exceptional in 
history. We need to look at relative casu-
alties, general mortality rates in wars, 
rather than at the aggregate created by 
the fact that many states participated in 
the world wars.
For example, in the Peloponnesian 
War (431-403 BC) Athens is estimat-
ed to have lost between a quarter and a 
third of its population, more than Ger-
many in the two world wars combined. 
In the first three years of the Second Pu-
nic War (218-216 BC), Rome lost some 
50,000 male citizens of the ages of 17-46, 
out of a total of about 200,000 in these 
ages. This was roughly 25 percent of the 
military age cohorts in only three years, 
the same range as the Russian military 
casualties and higher than the German 
rates in World War II. Similarly, in the 
thirteen century the Mongol conquests 
inflicted on the societies of China and 
Russia casualties and destruction that 
were among the highest ever suffered 
during historical times. Even by the 
lowest estimates casualties were at least 
as high as, and in China almost defini-
tely far higher than, the Soviet Union's 
horrific rate in World War II of about 15 
percent of its population. A final exam-
ple: during the Thirty Years War (1618-
1648) population loss in Germany is 
estimated at between a fifth and a third 
– either way again higher than the Ger-
man casualties in the First and Second 
World Wars combined.
People often assume that more devel-
oped military technology during mo-
dernity must mean greater lethality and 
destructiveness, but in fact it also means 
greater protective power, as with mech-
anized armour, mechanized speed and 
agility, and defensive electronic meas-
ures. Offensive and defensive advances 
generally rise in tandem and tend to off-
set each other. In addition, it is all too 
often forgotten that the vast majority of 
the many millions of non-combatants 
killed by Germany during World War 
II – Jews, Soviet prisoners of war, Soviet 
civilians – fell victim to intentional star-
vation, exposure to the elements, and 
mass executions rather than to any sop-
histicated military technology. Instances 
of genocide in general during the twen-
tieth century, much as earlier in history, 
were carried out with the simplest of 
technologies, as the Rwanda genocide 
horrifically reminded us.
Nor is it true that wars during the past 
two centuries have become economica-
lly more costly than they were earlier in 
history, again relative to overall wealth. 
War always involved massive econo-
mic exertion and was the single most 
expensive item of state spending. Both 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
Spain and eighteenth century France, 
for example, were economically ruined 




































in the French case brought about the Re-
volution. Furthermore, death by starva-
tion in premodern wars was widespread.
Another strand of interpretation of 
the perceived decrease in warfare du-
ring recent times has posited voluntary 
and ideaic factors, has attributed the 
decline of warfare during recent times 
to a social 'attitude change'. Why this 
attitude change should have occurred 
at this point in history rather than any 
time earlier is not explained. After all, 
most powerful moral doctrines such as 
Buddhism and Christianity decried war 
for millennia without this having any 
noticeable effect.
It is suggested that people have sud-
denly become aware that war is sense-
less if not crazy, devoid of any rationa-
le. Such a view of war is widespread in 
today's modern and affluent world. In 
the discipline of international relations 
so-called realists, especially ‘defensive 
realists’, even claim with a straight face 
that countries have never gained from 
war because of the balancing effect that 
contain rising powers. Try this strange 
idea on Rome, the Aztecs or Inca, the 
Ottomans, the Mughals or eighteenth 
century Britain, to name but a few out of 
many examples. Or on Chinggis Khan, 
whose descendants constitute, accor-
ding to genetic studies, 8 percent of all 
males in Eastern and Central Asia, evi-
dence of staggering sexual opportuni-
ties enjoyed by his sons and grandsons 
whose houses ruled over that part of the 
world for centuries.
And you should not think that only 
autocrats and military aristocracies pro-
fited from war, while the people were its 
unwilling victims. This idea was advan-
ced during the Enlightenment and is 
very popular today. However, it ought 
to be remembered that the two most 
successful war-making states of classi-
cal antiquity were democratic Athens 
and republican Rome. And they were so 
successful precisely because the people 
of these polities benefited from war and 
imperial expansion, championed them, 
and enlisted in their cause. Half of the 
Athenian budget at the time of Pericles 
came from the tribute of the Empire 
which was used to build the Acropolis 
and pay for the huge navy, in both of 
which the demos was employed.
We said before that in pursuit of their 
aims people may resort to cooperation, 
peaceful competition, or violent con-
flict. Each of these behavioral strategies 
is a well-designed tool interchangeably 
employed, depending on the particular 
circumstances and prospects of succe-
ss. Thus, to understand the gravitation 
of human choices – and norms – from 
violent conflict towards the non-violent 
options of cooperation and peaceful 
competition one needs to understand 
the changing circumstances and calcu-
lus of cost-effectiveness during the past 
two centuries and in recent decades.
So if modern war has not become 
more lethal and expensive, why the 
decline? Two main theories domina-
te the scene: the democratic peace and 
the capitalist/trade peace. But, in and of 
themselves they cannot be the complete 
answer because of the following, contra-
dicting historical evidence: premodern 
democracies and republics actually did 
fight each other; nondemocratic great 
powers also shared in the general re-
duction in belligerency during modern 
times, from 1815 on, including commu-
nist powers that largely opted out of the 
global trade system; until the nineteenth 
century states tried to monopolize tra-
de by force and bar all others out rather 
than share with them – think ancient 
Athens, medieval Venice, early modern 


























What then is the cause of the decline 
in belligerency? Even before the middle 
of the nineteenth century, thinkers such 
as Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte, and 
John Stuart Mill, who were quick to note 
the change, realized that it was caused 
by the advent of the industrial-com-
mercial revolution, the most profound 
transformation of human society since 
the Neolithic adoption of agriculture. 
In the first place, given explosive growth 
in per capita wealth, about 30 to 50-fold 
from the onset of the revolution to the 
present, the Malthusian trap has been 
broken. Wealth no longer constitutes a 
fundamentally finite quantity, when the 
only question is how it is divided, so 
wealth acquisition progressively shifted 
away from a zero-sum game.
Secondly, the significance of trade in 
the economy has ballooned to entirely 
new dimensions precisely because of the 
new process of industrial growth. Grea-
ter freedom of trade has become all the 
more attractive in the industrial age for 
the simple reason that the overwhelming 
share of fast-growing and diversifying 
production has now been intended for 
sale in the marketplace rather than for 
direct consumption by the family pro-
ducers themselves. During industriali-
zation, advanced powers' foreign trade 
increased twice as quickly as their fast 
growing GDPs, so that by the beginning 
of the twentieth century, exports plus 
imports grew to around half of GDP 
in Britain and France, more than one-
third in Germany, and around one-third 
in Italy and Japan. Consequently, eco-
nomies are no longer overwhelmingly 
autarkic, having become increasingly 
interconnected by specialization, scale 
and exchange. Foreign devastation po-
tentially depresses the entire system and 
is detrimental to a state's own wellbe-
ing. What Mill discerned in the abstract 
in the 1840s, was repeated by Norman 
Angel during the first global age before 
World War I, and formed the corner-
stone of John Maynard Keynes' criticism 
of the harsh reparations imposed on 
Germany after that war.
Greater economic openness has de-
creased the likelihood of war also by 
disassociating economic access from the 
confines of political borders and sover-
eignty. It is no longer necessary to politi-
cally possess a territory in order to benefit 
from it. Of all these factors, commercial 
interdependence has attracted most of 
the attention in the scholarly literature. 
But both the escape from Malthus with 
rapid industrial growth and open access 
have been no less significant aspects of 
what I call the Modernization Peace.
Thus, the greater the yield of compet-
itive economic cooperation, the more 
counterproductive and less attractive 
conflict becomes. Rather than war be-
coming more costly, as is widely be-
lieved, it is in fact peace that has been 
growing more profitable.
If so, why have wars continued to oc-
cur during the past two centuries, albeit 
at a much lower frequency? In the first 
place, ethnic and nationalist tensions 
often overrode the logic of the new eco-
nomic realities, accounting for most 
wars in Europe between 1815 and 1945. 
They continue to do so today, especially 
in the less developed parts of the globe. 
Moreover, the logic of the new econom-
ic realities receded during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, as 
the great powers resumed protectionist 
policies and expanded them to the un-
developed parts of the world with the 
New Imperialism. This development 
signalled that the emergent global econ-
omy might become partitioned rather 
than open, with each imperial domain 
becoming closed to everybody else, as, 
indeed, they eventually did in the 1930s, 
with the Great Depression. A snowball 




































for imperial territories. For the territo-
rially confined Germany and Japan the 
need to break away into imperial Leben-
sraum or 'co-prosperity sphere' seemed 
particularly pressing. Here lay the seeds 
of the two world wars. Furthermore, the 
retreat from economic liberalism in the 
first decades of the twentieth century 
spurred, and was spurred by, the rise 
to power of anti-liberal and anti-dem-
ocratic political ideologies and regimes, 
incorporating a creed of violence: com-
munism and fascism.
Since 1945 the decline of major war 
has deepened further. Nuclear weapons 
have been a crucial factor in this pro-
cess, but no less significant have been 
the institutionalization of free trade and 
the closely related process of rapid and 
sustained economic growth. The spread 
of liberal democracy has been equally 
potent. Indeed, although nonliberal and 
nondemocratic states also became much 
less belligerent during the industrial age, 
it is the liberal democracies that have 
been the most attuned to its pacifying 
aspects.
Relying on arbitrary coercive force at 
home, nondemocratic countries have 
found it more natural to use force abroad. 
By contrast, liberal democratic societies 
are socialized to peaceful, law-mediat-
ed relations at home, and their citizens 
have grown to expect that the same 
norms be applied internationally. Living 
in increasingly tolerant societies, they 
have grown more receptive to the Oth-
er's point of view. Promoting freedom, 
legal equality, and political participation 
domestically, liberal democratic powers 
– though initially in possession of vast 
empires – have found it increasingly dif-
ficult to justify ruling over foreign peo-
ples without their consent. And sancti-
fying life, liberty and human rights, they 
have proven to be failures in forceful 
repression. Furthermore, with the indi-
vidual’s life and pursuit of happiness ele-
vated above group values, sacrifice of life 
in war has increasingly lost legitimacy in 
liberal democratic societies. War retains 
legitimacy only under narrow and nar-
rowing formal and practical conditions, 
and is generally viewed as extremely ab-
horrent and undesirable.
Thus, modernization, most notably 
its liberal path, has sharply reduced the 
prevalence of war, as the violent option 
for fulfilling human desires has become 
much less rewarding than the peaceful 
option of competitive cooperation. For 
instance, with the much increased sexual 
opportunity within society, young men 
now are more reluctant to leave behind 
the pleasures of life for the rigors and 
chastity of the field. 'Make love, not war' 
was the slogan of the powerful anti-war 
youth campaign of the 1960s, which not 
accidentally coincided with a far-rea-
ching liberalization of sexual norms. 
Furthermore, is societies of plenty peo-
ple naturally become risk-averse. Ingel-
hart’s World Values Survey reflects this, 
as does, only a bit less seriously, Thomas 
Friedman’s concept of a Macdonald Pe-
ace. All these are interrelated aspects of 
the Modernization Peace.
The fruits of these deepening trends 
and sensibilities have been nothing 
short of miraculous. The probability of 
war between affluent democracies has 
declined to a vanishing point, where 
they no longer even see the need to pre-
pare for the possibility of a militarized 
dispute with one another. The security 
dilemma between neighbours – that 
seemingly intrinsic feature of interna-
tional anarchy – no longer exists among 
them. This is most conspicuously the 
case in North America and Western Eu-
rope, the world's most modernized and 
liberal-democratic regions.
Realists in international relations the-
ory have never been able to explain why 

























the slightest a German (or French) inva-
sion, a historically unprecedented situa-
tion. Similarly, Canada is not at all con-
cerned about the prospect of conquest 
by the United States, though people find 
it difficult to explain why exactly this is 
so. In East Asia, the most developed co-
untries, such as Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan, do not fear war among themse-
lves or with any of the other developed 
countries, though they are deeply appre-
hensive of being attacked by less develo-
ped neighbors, such as China or North 
Korea.
With the collapse of the Soviet Em-
pire and rapid economic growth cou-
pled with democratization in Eastern 
Europe, East and South Asia and Latin 
America, the prospect of a major war 
within the developed world seems to 
have become very remote. Thus, war's 
geopolitical centre of gravity has shifted 
radically. The modernized, economical-
ly developed parts of the world have be-
come a 'zone of peace'. War now appears 
to be confined to the less developed 
parts of the globe, the world's 'zone of 
war', where countries that have lagged 
behind in modernization and its paci-
fying spin-off effects occasionally still 
fight among themselves, as well as with 
developed countries.
Much the same applies to civil wars. 
Modernized, economically developed 
and liberal democratic countries have 
become practically free of civil wars – 
on account of their stronger consensual 
nature, plurality, tolerance, and indeed, 
a greater legitimacy for peaceful secessi-
on. By contrast, undeveloped and devel-
oping countries remain very susceptible 
to civil wars, and all the more so as many 
of them are ethnically fragmented and 
possessing a weak central government.
At this happy junction, it is time to 
turn our attention to some major coun-
tervailing forces, and stress that the dra-
matic spread of peace is far from being 
full-proof and free from shadows and 
challenges. The euphoric post-Cold War 
moment may have turned out to be a 
fleeting one, with the New World Order 
threatened by new Disorders.
Perhaps the most significant challenge 
is the return of capitalist nondemocrat-
ic great powers, a regime type that has 
been absent from the international sys-
tem since the defeat of Germany and 
Japan in 1945. The massive growth of 
formerly communist and fast industri-
alizing authoritarian-capitalist China 
represents the greatest change in the 
global balance of power. Russia, too, has 
retreated from its post-communist lib-
eralism and has assumed an increasingly 
authoritarian and nationalist character, 
coupled with a more aggressive stance, 
as in Crimea, the Ukraine and Syria. 
Will these powers eventually democ-
ratize with development is perhaps the 
most crucial question of the twenty-first 
century. The lessons of history are not as 
clear about the inevitability of the pro-
cess as some progressivists tend to be-
lieve. Furthermore, since the outbreak 
of the economic crisis the authoritarian 
great powers have gained much in confi-
dence, while the hegemony and prestige 
of democratic capitalism have suffered 
a massive blow unparalleled since the 
1930s and the rise of fascist and com-
munist totalitarianism. One hopes that 
the current economic and political ma-
laise will not be nearly as catastrophic. 
And yet the global allure of state-driven 
and nationalist capitalist authoritarian-
ism may grow substantially. At the same 
time, American might, the main reason 
– not sufficiently appreciated – for the 
triumph of democracy in the twentieth 
century, is undergoing relative decline, 
though probably not as steep as it is 
some times imagined.
Deeply integrated into the world 




































tarian powers partake of the develop-
ment-open-trade-capitalist peace, but 
not of the liberal-democratic one. The 
democratic and nondemocratic pow-
ers may coexist more or less peacefully, 
armed because of mutual fear and sus-
picion. But there is also the prospect of 
more antagonistic relations, accentuated 
ideological rivalry, potential and actu-
al conflict, intensified arms races, and 
new cold wars. May I point out that all 
this was written long before the recent 
crisis in the Ukraine and Syria and Chi-
na’s adoption of both a more assertive 
foreign policy and stronger repressive 
measures at home. Furthermore, the 
two countries' support for oppressive re-
gimes around the world – most notably 
today, Syria and Iran – may be a fore-
taste of things to come.
The September 11, 2001, mega-ter-
ror attacks in the United States have 
turned attention to yet another shadow 
hanging over the decline of belligeren-
cy – unconventional terror, employing 
weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, 
biological, and chemical. Of these, che-
mical weapons are the least dangerous, 
while biological weapons have the gre-
atest potential, as the biotechnological 
revolution is one of the spearheads of 
today’s technological advance. The rev-
olutionary breakthroughs in the deci-
pherment of the genome and in biotech-
nology open up new horizons in terms 
of lethality and accessibility. A virulent 
laboratory-cultivated strain of bacteria 
or virus, let alone a specially enginee-
red 'superbug' against which no immu-
nization exist, might bring the lethality 
of biological weapons within the range 
of nuclear attacks, while being far more 
easily accessible to terrorists than nucle-
ar weapons. Fortunately, in contrast to 
chemical and biological agents, terror-
ists cannot produce nuclear weapons. 
Yet they might obtain them from those 
who can.
At the root of the problem is the trick-
ling down to below the state level of the 
technologies and materials of mass kill-
ing. The greatest threat of nuclear prolif-
eration into countries with low security 
standards and high levels of corruption 
is the far-increased danger of leakage. 
Furthermore, states in the less developed 
and unstable parts of the world are ever 
in danger of disintegration and anarchy. 
When state authority collapses and an-
archy takes hold, who is to guarantee 
the country's nuclear arsenal? Pakistan, 
with its past sales of nuclear knowhow 
and potential instability, is a much dis-
cussed case. Indeed, failed states like the 
collapsed Soviet Union rather than the 
former nuclear superpower may be the 
model for future threats. The emergence 
of the so-called Caliphate of Iraq and 
Syria, with its virulent anti-modernist 
ideology and hideous practices is anoth-
er recent example.
Scenarios of world-threatening indi-
viduals and organizations, previously 
reserved to fiction of the James Bond 
genre, suddenly become real. Because 
deterrence based on mutual assured 
destruction scarcely applies to terror-
ists, the use of ultimate weapons is more 
likely to come from them than it is from 
states. Unconventional capability ac-
quired by terrorists is useable. Indeed, 
once the potential exists it is difficult to 
see what will stop it from materializing, 
somewhere, sometime.
This is a baffling problem, which does 
not lend itself to easy or clear solutions. 
Defensive measures are almost as prob-
lematic as the pre-emptive, especially 
in the democracies, because of their 
infringement on civil rights. Regarding 
both the offensive and defensive ele-
ments of the 'war on terror' the debate in 
the democracies assumes a bitterly ideo-
logical and righteous character. And yet 

























is real, is here to stay, and it offers no 
easy solutions.
We are clearly experiencing the most 
peaceful times in history by far, a stri-
kingly blissful and deeply grounded 
trend. Yet it is also true that this is also 
the most dangerous world ever, with 
people for the first time possessing the 
ability to destroy themselves completely 
and even individuals and small groups 
gaining the ability to cause mass death. 
The Modernization Peace is a very real 
phenomenon, but it is not immune to 
dangers and threats, some of them old, 
some new.
Proverbially, predictions are just fine 
as long as they are not applied to the fu-
ture. Past trends may change direction 
or interact differently over time. We can 
only hope that, despite ups and downs, 
the general trends will endure.
